In the 1980s, as the US military was being transformed from an arm of the State Department to an agency of the military-industrial complex, an old-school military ice cream company called Snow King went under.
Its executives had gone on to become top executives in the US Air Force and later in the Pentagon.
The company, which also made the ice-cream cone, had been around for more than a century.
But the US government decided that the Snow King should be privatised.
At the time, Snow King was an established, profitable ice-skating company, and the government didn’t want to make that change without having a competitive advantage.
The privatisation plan called for the company to become a military contractor, run by a new company called X-Com.
X-com was a US military contractor with its own army-owned planes and other equipment.
It was the first time the US had privatised a US company.
“Snow King was one of the best-known US companies,” says Mark Fuhrman, a defence analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.
“They were the largest ice-cannon company in the world.”
The privatised Snow King is the first US company to be sold to private ownership.
Xcom, which has a $60 billion market value, has a long history in the military.
It had a $3 billion contract to build the Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter plane in 1991.
But Xcom is still owned by Lockheed Martin.
The new company, XCOM X, is a spin-off of the company XCOM, which was the former name of X-COM, the successor to X-Force, a US special forces team that was based in Baghdad during the 2003 Iraq War.
XCOM was supposed to be a part of a special operations team led by Colonel Jason Russell.
But Russell was killed in a car accident in 2008 and the X-Men franchise was born in 2011.
X com’s main mission, according to its website, is “to train and equip soldiers and law enforcement agencies to better counter threats from a variety of hostile and complex adversaries.”
But its mission statement also describes it as “a global network of experts to counter emerging and threatening global threats.”
The company’s main role, according the website, was “developing and integrating technologies to defend US and allied interests abroad”.
The X-commandos were supposed to lead X-forces.
The X commandos were also supposed to support the X commando team.
In other words, they were supposed the main actors in a US force to support a US army team fighting a foreign enemy.
And the US did not have to worry about foreign allies.
The US did have a few allies, though.
The State Department’s Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, is based in Fort Benning, Georgia, a base near the Georgia border.
JSOC was created in 2004 to provide “specialised support for US Special Operations forces deployed overseas to advise, assist, and coordinate on US military operations in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia.”
The US also had its own commandos in Baghdad, who were called the Joint Special Task Force (JSTF), which was established in 2005.
The JSTF was supposed a part-time force of “highly trained and experienced special operations soldiers”, with some of them having spent time in Iraq.
But there was a problem with the team, because the Iraqis were not prepared to lead the JSTF.
In 2007, they refused to take part in training exercises because the training exercises were being held in Iraq’s desert.
The Iraqis wanted to go home, and so they withdrew from the training.
“The Iraqis are extremely unhappy with the JSTSF,” says Brian O’Connor, a former military officer who is now the executive director of the Iraq Institute at West Point.
“It’s one of their big problems in the fight against the Islamic State.”
But the Iraqi army didn’t like that either.
The Iraq National Congress, which controlled the Iraqi military, rejected the Iraq forces request to train in their country.
The Iraqi government, led by the now-defunct former president Saddam Hussein, refused to let the JS forces leave their country, and ordered the Iraqis to remain in Iraq, which means they stayed there.
The Americans were supposed, however, to be there, so the Iraqis agreed to train.
The training went well, and JSTF became a part time team in 2010.
It would go on to train thousands of Iraqis.
But this was not the only Iraqi unit to refuse to train, and its failure to get the job done was a big problem for the Americans.
The reason, says O’Connor, was that the Iraqis believed the training was for them, not the Iraqis.
And it was an Iraqi unit that had the reputation of being a bunch of assholes, says Mark Fisher, a professor of international security at George Washington University.
In 2014, when US forces were trying